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Forex multi-account manager Z-X-N
Accepts global forex account operation, investment, and trading
Assists family office investment and autonomous management

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In the two-way foreign exchange market, the participant structure is complex. Traders with different capital sizes and trading strategies have fundamentally different order processing paths and positioning within the brokerage system.

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For retail traders with small capital, the first core fact they must clearly understand is this: in the current forex market ecosystem, small retail investors are almost inevitably classified as B-position clients. This classification is not determined by a single factor, but rather the result of the combined effects of market rules, brokerage profit logic, and the retail investor's own trading characteristics.
1. The "Hidden Attributes" of the B-position Mechanism: Trading Rules Unspoken by the Platform.
In the forex industry, "B-position" is a concept rarely publicly mentioned by brokers. No trading platform, compliant or non-compliant, will admit in its official promotional materials that "we divide our clients into A-position and B-position, and that retail investors belong to B-position." The core reason for this is that the essence of Warehouse B is that brokers act as counterparties to orders. This means that retail investors' trades are not directly connected to the external market (such as with LP liquidity providers), but are instead completed within the broker's internal trading system.
From a platform operational perspective, this "internal trading" model makes sense: on the one hand, by integrating internal retail orders, the platform can reduce the costs and risks of connecting with external LPs; on the other hand, retail investors' trading behavior (such as high-frequency short-term trading and small capital with low risk tolerance) means that their orders can be matched without relying on external liquidity. However, the platform does not proactively disclose this mechanism, essentially to avoid raising questions among retail investors about "trading fairness" and "whether orders enter the real market" and to maintain the platform's external image of "connecting to the global market."
Second, small-capital retail investors are inevitably the three core drivers of Warehouse B.
The placement of small retail investors in Warehouse B isn't subjective discrimination on the part of brokers, but rather a necessary choice based on risk control, cost accounting, and profitability. This can be analyzed from three perspectives:
(I) The Conflict between High Leverage and Margin Requirements: Retail Investors Have No Leverage Options in Warehouse A One of the core attractions of forex trading is high leverage. Small retail investors often rely on leverage to amplify their trading volume, aiming to achieve high returns on a small investment. However, if retail investors were placed in Warehouse A (i.e., their orders were routed to LPs via the STP model), this demand would be completely unmet. This is because upstream LPs (such as international investment banks and large clearing houses) impose strict margin requirements on brokers. To place a client's order with an LP, brokers must pay a certain percentage of the order size (typically 1%-5%, adjusted based on the client's risk level) to the LP.
If a retail investor is placed in Warehouse A, the broker must provide margin for each retail investor's order. Taking 100x leverage as an example, a retail investor with $1,000 in principal can trade a $100,000 contract. The broker would then need to pay $1,000-$5,000 in margin to the LP (calculated at a 1%-5% margin). Since the retail investor's principal is only $1,000, the broker not only cannot collect the full margin from the retail investor but also has to bear the burden of front-loading it, resulting in extremely high capital costs. Therefore, from a leverage perspective, retail investors have absolutely no chance of entering Warehouse A.
(II) Broker's Profit Logic: Retail investors in Warehouse A cannot generate revenue for the platform.
A broker's core goal is profitability, but the returns generated by Warehouse A and Warehouse B differ significantly:
In the Warehouse A model, brokers can only charge a fixed fee and spread, and must bear the cost of margin payments to LPs. If retail investors trade infrequently and hold positions for long periods, the platform's profit margin will be further compressed.
In the Warehouse B model, retail investors' trading characteristics (small capital, short-term trading, and low risk tolerance) lead to long-term losses (industry data shows that over 80% of small-capital, short-term traders ultimately lose money). As the counterparty, brokers can directly access retail investors' stop-loss funds and margin calls, while also collecting higher fees through high-frequency trading—revenues far exceeding the meager spreads in the Warehouse A model.
For brokers, allocating retail investors to Warehouse B is a natural choice for maximizing returns. Conversely, allocating retail investors to Warehouse A exposes the platform to the dual pressures of meager returns and margin payments, potentially even leading to losses.
(3) The Underlying Need for Risk Control: Retail investors in Warehouse A amplify platform risk.
In addition to cost-benefit considerations, risk control is another core reason brokers refuse to assign retail investors to Warehouse A. LPs have strict "risk assessment" requirements for broker orders. If brokers place a large number of retail orders with LPs, they face two major risks:
Risk of High Volatility in Retail Trading: Retail investors generally lack professional trading strategies and are prone to placing orders frequently due to emotional fluctuations, chasing rising and falling prices. This leads to poor profit stability and a high probability of losses. If LPs accept a large number of such orders, concentrated losses among retail investors may trigger a chain reaction, leading to demands for increased margin or order size restrictions from brokers.
Risk of Joint Liability for Brokers: If retail investors file "malicious complaints" or "refuse to cover losses" due to losses, LPs may shift the responsibility to brokers, requiring them to cover the difference in losses. This creates an additional "unwarranted risk" for brokers, further increasing operational pressure. Therefore, from a risk control perspective, brokers assigning retail investors to Warehouse B is essentially a necessary measure to "isolate external risks." By internally accepting orders, the risks of retail trading are contained within the platform, preventing retail orders from impacting the cooperative relationship with LPs. This also reduces the impact of external risks on platform operations. III. The Deeper Reasons Why Mainstream Brokers Are Abandoning Large-Capital Clients in Warehouse A. While small-capital retail investors are being clearly assigned to Warehouse B, a more noteworthy market phenomenon is that mainstream forex brokers worldwide (including some traditional forex banks) are gradually abandoning their large-capital client business in Warehouse A. This has resulted in many large-capital client account opening applications being "delayed" and ultimately abandoned. This phenomenon reflects brokers' rebalancing of risk and reward, which can be attributed to three core factors: (1) The "low profitability" of large-capital clients: brokers struggle to generate excess profits.
The trading characteristics of large-cap clients in Warehouse A are completely opposite to those of retail investors: they typically have professional trading teams and sophisticated trading strategies, tend to trade long-term, trade infrequently, and rarely stop-loss orders. This results in extremely limited profits for brokers from these large-cap clients:
Low Trading Frequency: Large-cap clients often hold long-term positions, perhaps only a few times per month. The fees and spreads charged by brokers are far lower than those of high-frequency retail traders.
Low Stop-Loss/Margin Call Probability: Large-cap clients have large capital and strong risk tolerance, and are rarely forced to stop-loss orders or margin calls due to short-term market fluctuations. Brokers are unable to profit from "client losses."
Strong Negotiation Power: Large-cap clients have significant negotiating power over fees and spreads, often demanding preferential terms like "zero fees" and "low spreads" from brokers, further squeezing brokers' profit margins.
For brokers, serving large-capital clients requires significant investment in both manpower and resources (e.g., dedicated account managers and customized trading systems), but the returns are far lower than those from serving retail investors. This represents a "high-investment, low-return" business, making it difficult for brokers to become a core business focus.
(II) The "High Risk" of Large-Capital Clients: Brokers face the "Risk of Margin Call."
Although large-capital clients are highly resilient to risk, this does not mean their trading is risk-free. On the contrary, the "large size of their capital" can lead to greater risks. If large-capital clients suffer significant losses, brokers may face "unbearable losses."
The "Liquidity Risk" of Large-Capital Orders: Large-capital clients can trade in the millions or even tens of millions of dollars per transaction. If brokers pass these orders to limited partners, they must ensure that the limited partners have sufficient liquidity to cover them. In the event of extreme market conditions (such as black swan events), LPs may be unable to promptly accept orders, resulting in orders being unfulfilled and brokers bearing the client's losses. Compliance risks for large clients: The sources of funds and trading purposes of large clients are often more complex. If compliance issues such as "unclear source of funds" or "suspected money laundering" arise, brokers may be investigated by regulators and face serious consequences such as fines and license revocation. In contrast, retail clients have smaller funds and lower compliance risks, making them "safer" for brokers. Therefore, for brokers, serving large clients is equivalent to "taking high risks for low returns," which does not conform to the operating principle of "risk-return matching." Abandoning this type of business is a rational choice for risk avoidance. (III) Changes in the Market Ecosystem: Retail clients become mainstream. With the increasing popularity of the foreign exchange market, small retail clients have become the mainstream market participants (accounting for over 90%), while the number of large clients is relatively small (less than 10%). From the perspective of economies of scale, brokers can maximize profits by focusing their resources on retail clients:
A large number of retail clients: Even if individual retail clients have small capital, this vast client base can provide brokers with stable commissions, spread income, and excess profits from retail client losses;
Low operating costs: Serving retail clients can be achieved through standardized trading systems and automated customer service, eliminating the need to invest significant resources in individual clients and improving operational efficiency;
Intense market competition: Amidst increasingly fierce competition in the forex industry, brokers have adopted a common strategy of attracting retail clients through low account opening barriers and high leverage. In contrast, serving large-capital clients requires competing with other large institutions (such as investment banks and private banks), which is more challenging and offers fewer advantages.
Based on these factors, major global brokers are gradually abandoning their large-capital A-position business and shifting their focus to retail B-position business, which is an inevitable trend in the development of the forex market.
Fourth, Conclusion: Retail clients with small capital need to rationally understand their market positioning.
For retail investors with small capital, clarifying their "B-Warehouse" status does not mean "unfair trading," but rather requires a rational understanding of the operating logic of the forex market:
Accept market rules: The B-Warehouse model is a choice made by brokers based on risk control and profit needs, and it is also a prerequisite for retail investors to obtain high-leverage trading opportunities;
Be wary of trading risks: Retail investors' losses are essentially caused by their own trading strategies and insufficient risk control capabilities, not by brokers' deliberate targeting. They should reduce the probability of losses by improving their professional skills and controlling their trading frequency;
Choose a compliant platform: Although all B-Warehouse platforms strictly adhere to regulatory rules (such as client fund segregation and fair pricing), they can maximize the security of retail investors' funds and avoid the additional risks caused by the platform's "market making."
At the same time, the difficulty large-cap clients face opening accounts also reflects the trend of "retailization" in the forex market. Brokerage firms' business trends clearly indicate that retail clients are the core of the current forex market, while the needs of large-cap clients are gradually being taken over by more professional institutional services (such as private banks and hedge funds).
In short, whether small-cap retail or large-cap clients, only by clearly understanding their own position in the forex market and understanding the broker's business logic can they make more rational trading decisions and better manage market risks.

A regrettable phenomenon in two-way forex trading is that the harder a trader works, the more likely they are to lose money.

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This is primarily because most traders lack the skills and mental fortitude required for short-term trading. In reality, most investors lack the ability to engage in short-term trading, yet many invest excessive time and energy in this area.
The pitfalls of market watching. Many traders are accustomed to watching the market for extended periods, believing that this helps them better grasp market opportunities. However, this practice often backfires. Long periods of watching the market not only fail to improve trading success rates, but can actually increase impulsive trading. When faced with price fluctuations and account profits and losses, traders are easily swayed by emotions, leading to irrational decisions. This psychological phenomenon is part of human nature and difficult to overcome through simple self-control.
Short-term trading requires not only the ability to accurately judge short-term price trends, but more importantly, exceptional mental fortitude. Facing market fluctuations, traders must remain calm and composed. However, this mental fortitude contradicts human instinct. Most people struggle to maintain composure in the face of price fluctuations and are often influenced by emotions. For example, overtrading and frequently checking account profits and losses are manifestations of human instinct. These behaviors are amplified in short-term trading, ultimately leading traders to make irrational decisions.
The risks of frequent trading. When communicating with investors who have suffered losses, I've found a common problem: frequent trading. These investors often feel compelled to place orders after prolonged periods of watching the market, even when they know it might not be the best time. This behavior directly results in increased trading costs and risks, while profits are difficult to guarantee. Frequent trading not only consumes a trader's time and energy, but can also lead to overtrading, further exacerbating losses.
Suggestions for rational trading: To avoid this dilemma, traders can try the following strategies:
1. Reduce time spent watching the market: Avoid excessively watching the market, as this only increases impulsive trading. Instead, spend a certain amount of time each day analyzing market sentiment and trends and developing a sound trading plan.
2. Pending order trading: By setting reasonable take-profit and stop-loss points, pending order trading can reduce the influence of emotions on trading decisions. This not only saves time but also prevents poor decisions caused by emotional fluctuations.
3. Focus on long-term analysis: Focus your time and energy on macroeconomic market analysis rather than short-term price fluctuations. Long-term trends are often easier to grasp than short-term fluctuations and are more within the capabilities of most investors.
4. Avoid full-time trading: If you lack sufficient funds and skills, do not attempt full-time trading. Trading is not easy and requires expertise, experience, and a strong mindset. Full-time trading requires more resources and preparation, and may expose you to greater risks.
In the two-way trading of forex, traders need to recognize their own abilities and psychological limitations. Most investors lack the skills and mental fortitude required for short-term trading, so they should avoid frequent trading and prolonged periods of market observation. By reducing their time spent observing the market, adopting pending orders, and focusing on long-term analysis, traders can better control their emotions, reduce trading risks, and achieve more stable trading performance in the forex market.

In the two-way forex market, account custody services have attracted considerable attention due to their ability to "earn returns without having to personally operate."

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However, in the current market, some custody teams' advertising and promotional efforts clearly deviate from common sense, particularly regarding profit promises. These claims not only mislead investors but also expose the unprofessionalism of the services themselves. Rationally distinguishing the legitimacy of profit claims and deconstructing the logical contradictions of high-yield promises are key to investor risk mitigation and the foundation for building trust with custody teams.
In forex account custody advertisements, "return promises" are a key draw, but the rationality behind returns expressed over different timeframes varies widely. From the perspective of market principles and investment common sense, a 20% annualized return promise, while high, is theoretically achievable. This requires the custody team to possess a sophisticated trading system, rigorous risk control, and rely on long-term, stable market trends rather than short-term luck. However, claims of "20% monthly returns" completely transcend common sense investment logic, and the risks inherent in them are far beyond the reach of ordinary investors.
A simple mathematical calculation reveals a contradiction: if the monthly return consistently reaches 20%, compounded, the funds would grow to approximately 7.4 times the initial principal after one year (1.2^12≈7.4), and as much as 54.8 times after two years. This "exponential wealth growth in a short period of time" model has never been replicated in mature financial markets. Even private equity and hedge funds, renowned for their high returns, cannot achieve such exaggerated short-term returns. More importantly, the foreign exchange market is influenced by multiple factors, including macroeconomics, monetary policy, and geopolitics, leading to highly uncertain price fluctuations. Achieving a "stable 20% profit" in the short term (e.g., monthly) is essentially equivalent to "continuously predicting random fluctuations," completely violating the risk-return principle of financial markets. Some custodial teams advertise their capabilities, claiming they can achieve monthly returns of 20% or even multiples of that. However, from a logical perspective, such claims are inherently contradictory and fail to withstand the test of common sense. First, considering the alignment between profitability and behavioral logic: if a custodial team truly possesses the core capability of achieving a "20% monthly profit," their optimal approach is definitely not to "frequently post information and engage in marketing online." A rational decision-making approach should prioritize combining personal capital with funds from friends and family. Assuming an initial investment of $100,000, compounded at 20% monthly interest, this could grow to $740,000 after one year, $5.48 million after two years, and over $39 million after three years, achieving financial freedom in just a few years. This process eliminates the need to recruit external clients and builds trust by sharing profits with friends and family. There's no need to publicly disclose "high-yield opportunities," nor is there any need to expand the size of funds by distributing profits to outsiders (investors). After all, when one possesses the ability to create wealth, sharing profits with others dilutes one's own gains, which goes against the inherent nature of capital's pursuit of profit.
Secondly, from the perspective of "industry benchmark returns," promises of high returns are even more deceptive. Globally, the long-term returns of top fund managers have long defined the market's "excellence" threshold. Peak performance often results in annualized returns in the 20%-30% range, requiring extensive investment research teams, sophisticated quantitative models, and deep insight into global markets. In contrast, ordinary forex custodian teams lack the resources of top institutions or a proven track record of long-term market performance, yet they claim "20% monthly returns." The credibility of their claims is therefore questionable.
For forex account custodian teams, the core purpose of advertising should be to "deliver real value," not to "attract clients with false promises." False high-yield advertisements may seem to attract investors in the short term, but they are essentially "drinking poison to quench thirst"—firstly, such propaganda cannot withstand the test of reality. If actual returns fail to materialize, investors will quickly realize the truth and not only demand to redeem their funds, but may also damage the custodian team's reputation through word-of-mouth. Secondly, false advertising attracts "speculative investors" who lack investment common sense. These investors often have a poor understanding of risks, and if losses occur, they are likely to cause disputes and even disrupt the normal operations of the custodian team.
In contrast, realistic advertising, while perhaps less appealing in the short term, can lay a foundation of trust for the custodian team's long-term development. Specifically, authentic advertising should include three core elements: First, clear return expectations, not shying away from the fact that returns fluctuate, and objectively informing investors that historical returns are not indicative of future performance; second, transparent trading logic, clearly explaining to investors where returns come from, including trading strategies, risk control measures, and position management methods; and third, a verifiable performance record, providing complete historical trading data (rather than selectively displaying profitable orders), with data that can be cross-validated with third-party platforms (such as forex brokers).
This type of advertising based on common sense and facts not only helps identify high-quality investors with a rational understanding of risk and reduces disputes in subsequent cooperation, but also allows the custodian team to focus on improving trading capabilities rather than fabricating false claims. Building a reputation through long-term, stable performance creates a virtuous cycle of "authentic advertising – attracting rational clients – performance verification – and word-of-mouth communication."
Common sense is the first line of defense for investors and the bottom line for custodian teams. The essence of forex account custodian services is the "matching of professional expertise with investor funds," and the core foundation of trust stems from the "matching of returns and risks." Investors should remember that "common sense is more important than profit promises" when viewing custodial advertising. Any claims exceeding the top-tier "20% annualized return," especially those claiming "high monthly returns," should be viewed with extreme caution. Using logical reasoning and comparing against industry benchmarks, one can discern any falsehoods. Custody teams must be aware that "false advertising will ultimately backfire." Only by adhering to common sense and delivering genuine value can they survive in the fiercely competitive market.
The long-standing laws of the financial market have long proven that there are no "low-risk, high-return, no-barrier" investment opportunities. Any profit promises that defy common sense are inherently misleading. For both investors and custodial teams, only by respecting common sense and respecting the market can sustainable development be achieved in the complex environment of two-way foreign exchange trading.

In the forex two-way trading ecosystem, a broker's trading model (such as STP or ECN) directly determines the flow of investor orders and the fairness of the trading environment. The choice between Warehouse A (sell order model) and Warehouse B (betting model) is a core criterion for measuring whether a broker adheres to market rules.

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Currently, some brokers claim to adopt the STP/ECN model while only serving Warehouse B clients. This behavior fundamentally deviates from the core logic of the STP/ECN model and constitutes "imitation in form rather than compliance in substance." Furthermore, the changing role of retail investors and the depletion of market liquidity have further exacerbated the complexity of the forex trading environment, necessitating an in-depth analysis of both the model's nature and the current market situation.
1. The Core Logic of the STP/ECN Model: Order flow determines the model's authenticity. To determine whether a broker is a "true STP/ECN" model, it's important to first understand the core definitions of the two models. Their essence is "directly connecting investor orders to the external liquidity market," rather than "earning profits by betting against client orders."
1. Core Characteristics of a True STP/ECN Model.
STP (Straight-Through Processing) model: Brokers automatically route investor orders (regardless of long or short, large or small) to partnering LPs (liquidity providers, such as international banks, hedge funds, and liquidity aggregators) through their systems, without manual intervention. Brokers themselves do not participate in counterparty transactions and earn service revenue solely through spreads or commissions. In this model, investors' profits and losses are determined by actual market fluctuations, with no direct conflict of interest with the broker.
ECN (Electronic Communication Network) model: This model builds a multi-dimensional liquidity pool, integrating orders from multiple LPs, institutional investors, and other retail investors to create an "order matching mechanism." Investors' buy orders can be directly matched with sell orders from other investors, or with LPs' liquidity orders. Its core advantage is "no dealer intervention," resulting in fast order execution, low slippage, and a generally floating spread that adjusts with market liquidity.
Both models share the premise that brokers do not act as counterparties to client orders and must complete order hedging through external liquidity markets. This is what distinguishes them from the "market maker betting model (B warehouse)." 2. The contradictory nature of "only operating B warehouse while claiming STP/ECN." If a broker only serves clients in the B-position (i.e., all client orders are handled by the broker itself as the counterparty, with no orders placed with external LPs), then no matter how it "mimics" the STP/ECN model in terms of spreads and commissions (e.g., setting low fixed spreads and charging small commissions), it will not change the "essential nature of gambling." This contradiction manifests itself in two ways: Definition of the Order Flow Divergence Model: The core of STP/ECN is "outsourcing orders to the liquid market." In the B-position model, client orders are completely processed internally by the broker—client profits mean broker losses, and client losses mean broker profits. This conflict of interests completely contradicts the STP/ECN model's logic of aligning the interests of brokers and clients (the more active the client, the higher the broker's commission income). Lack of risk hedging mechanisms: In a true STP/ECN model, brokers transfer market risk by selling orders to LPs, bearing only the operational risk of their "channel services." Brokers operating solely for B-positions, on the other hand, bear the market risk of all client orders. If large clients profit or market conditions are extreme, they are prone to liquidity crises, potentially leading to an inability to pay client profits. This can ultimately lead to the platform's closure or withdrawal restrictions, harming investor rights. In short, "B-position-only" and "true STP/ECN" are mutually exclusive. The authenticity of the model isn't determined by superficial measures like spreads and commissions, but rather by the core behavior of whether orders are truly connected to the external liquidity market. Second, Market Liquidity Exhaustion: A Vicious Cycle of Changing Roles of Retail Investors and a Deteriorating Trading Environment. The current "almost exhausted liquidity" problem facing the foreign exchange market is not accidental, but rather the inevitable result of the changing role of retail investors and the imbalanced market participation structure. This shift not only alters market volatility but also further squeezes retail investors' profit margins, creating a vicious cycle of "reduced liquidity – low volatility – retail investor withdrawal – further liquidity reduction."
1. Retail investors with small capital: Transformed from "trading participants" to "passive liquidity providers."
In the traditional foreign exchange market, liquidity is primarily provided by limited partners (LPs), such as large international banks and liquidity aggregators. LPs ensure stable market price fluctuations by continuously quoting prices and taking large orders, while retail investors profit from these fluctuations. However, in recent years, as the market environment shifts, the role of retail investors has gradually reversed: LPs have gradually withdrawn from the retail foreign exchange market. Due to factors such as tightening global regulation (such as the EU's MiFID II and Australia's ASIC regulations) and increased foreign exchange volatility (such as the Federal Reserve's interest rate hikes and geopolitical conflicts), large LPs have reduced their risk appetite in the retail foreign exchange market and gradually reduced their liquidity supply to small and medium-sized brokers, resulting in a decrease in overall external liquidity in the market.
Retail orders are forced to become "liquidity supplements": When external LP liquidity is insufficient, some brokers, to maintain order execution efficiency, will "match" retail orders internally—directly matching a buy order from retail investor A with a sell order from retail investor B, eliminating the need for brokers to issue orders externally. In this situation, retail investors are no longer "trading through liquidity" but rather "providing liquidity to the market." Their trading behavior effectively becomes the counterparty to other investors, significantly compressing their profit margins.
More importantly, retail investors with small capital often lack professional risk control and trend analysis skills. In their role of "passively providing liquidity," they are more susceptible to losses due to random market fluctuations or brokerage matching rules (such as slippage and delayed execution). This can lead to a belief that "the more you trade, the more you lose," ultimately leading them to exit the market.
2. The direct consequence of liquidity depletion: Market fluctuations become "still," and trend opportunities disappear.
Foreign exchange market fluctuations are fundamentally driven by an imbalance in supply and demand. When large amounts of capital are concentrated in long or short positions on a currency pair, the price develops a clear trend (e.g., a unilateral rise or fall), which presents a key profit opportunity for retail investors. However, as retail investors exit and limited partnership liquidity decreases, the market's supply and demand gradually become more balanced. This manifests itself as:
Short-term fluctuations become fragmented: Prices no longer exhibit a continuous trend, but instead fluctuate repeatedly within a narrow range with extremely small fluctuations (e.g., the EUR/USD fluctuates only 30-50 pips daily). Even if retail investors can capture these fluctuations, they struggle to cover transaction costs such as spreads and commissions, significantly increasing their profitability.
Disappearance of trending markets: Without the driving force of large-scale capital (such as institutions and limited partnerships), the market struggles to form sustained, unilateral movements. This can even lead to "false breakouts" and "shockwaves," further misleading retail investors. For example, a currency pair may appear to break through a key resistance level, but in reality, it is a short-term fluctuation driven by a small number of retail orders, followed by a rapid decline, trapping retail investors who chased their orders.
This "still" market environment, in turn, exacerbates retail investors' desire to exit. Since they can't profit from trend fluctuations and transaction costs remain high, most retail investors will choose to abandon short-term trading. At the same time, new retail investors are also reluctant to enter the market due to word-of-mouth rumors that "there are no opportunities in the market," ultimately leading to a further depletion of market liquidity and a vicious cycle.
III. Responses from Investors and Regulators: From "Pattern Identification" to "Environmental Improvement."
Faced with the distortion of broker models and the market liquidity crisis, investors need to improve their risk identification capabilities, and regulators need to strengthen market regulations to jointly promote a rational foreign exchange trading environment.
1. Investors: Penetrate the broker model and rationally assess the trading environment.
Verify the authenticity of order flows: When selecting an STP/ECN broker, request "liquidity connection certification" (such as a cooperation agreement with LPs and order execution reports), or use third-party tools (such as order execution delay detection software) to verify whether there are "inner matching traces" (i.e., buy and sell orders at the same time are perfectly matched, without the influence of external market fluctuations).
Beware of the "low spread + B-position only" trap: If a broker claims to offer an "STP/ECN model" but only offers a B-position account, and the spread is significantly lower than the market average (e.g., 0.1-0.3 pips on the EUR/USD), be extremely cautious. This "low cost" is essentially a "betting temptation." If client profits exceed the broker's capacity, service reduction or fund security risks are likely to occur.
Adjust trading strategies to adapt to market conditions: In markets with dwindling liquidity, avoid high-frequency short-term trading (such as scalping) and instead adopt a medium- to long-term trading strategy. By analyzing macroeconomic data (such as interest rate decisions and GDP data) to identify long-term trends, you can mitigate the impact of short-term fluctuations on your trading.
2. Regulators: Strengthen compliance oversight of trading models and promote the development of a liquid market.
Clear regulatory standards for the STP/ECN model: Regulations will define the core elements of "true STP/ECN" (such as order-out ratios, LP partner qualifications, and order execution transparency). Penalties will be imposed on brokers that claim to offer STP/ECN services while only offering B-position trading, thus eliminating "model fraud."
Guiding LPs back into the retail market: Policy support (such as streamlining compliance processes and reducing risk reserve requirements) will encourage large international LPs to collaborate with compliant brokers to replenish market liquidity. Simultaneously, the development of "liquidity aggregation platforms" will be promoted to integrate multi-channel liquidity resources and improve overall market order execution efficiency.
Strengthening investor education: Through official platforms, we will educate retail investors on the core differences between "A-position/B-position" and "STP/ECN," as well as the correlation between market liquidity and profit opportunities. This will help retail investors develop a rational investment perspective and avoid falling into trading traps caused by "model misunderstandings" or the allure of high returns.
Model authenticity and ample liquidity are the twin pillars of a healthy foreign exchange market. The core value of two-way forex trading lies in providing investors with the opportunity to realize asset appreciation through market fluctuations. The realization of this value relies on two prerequisites: the authenticity of the brokerage model (STP/ECN must truly connect to external liquidity) and sufficient market liquidity (sufficient funds to drive trend fluctuations). The current practice of some brokers imitating STP/ECN models while only offering B-position trading, coupled with the current situation of dwindling market liquidity, not only harms investor rights but also undermines the foundation of trust in the forex market.
For brokers, long-term development can only be achieved by adhering to the bottom line of "model compliance" and attracting rational investors through authentic STP/ECN services. Investors, on the other hand, need to use their expertise to identify model pitfalls and respond rationally to market changes. Regulators, on the other hand, need to establish institutional frameworks to regulate market order and promote the restoration of the liquidity ecosystem. Only through the coordinated efforts of these three parties can the forex market return to its fundamental principles of fairness, transparency, and efficiency, creating a sustainable trading environment for all participants.

In the field of forex trading, investors must clearly understand that Expert Advisors (EAs) are not a panacea and are not fully adapted to the complexities of the forex market.

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Despite this, advertisements related to EAs appear frequently. This may be because forex agents and brokers use the keyword "EA" as a disguised marketing tool to attract more potential customers.
In forex trading, the majority of short-term traders are small-capital retail investors. This group is often the main source of losses. Short-term trading is inherently challenging, and profit opportunities are relatively limited. When small-capital retail traders struggle to achieve profitability, they often seek new methods and tools to improve their trading performance. EAs become a focus of their attention. Forex agents and brokers capitalize on this, promoting EAs to attract small-capital retail investors to open trading accounts, thereby providing market traffic.
However, if EAs can truly achieve stable profits, then EA providers are more likely to choose to trade them themselves to reap the profits rather than sell them. This logic is simple and obvious, and deserves careful consideration by every investor.

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13711580480@139.com

+86 137 1158 0480

+86 137 1158 0480

+86 137 1158 0480

z.x.n@139.com

Mr. Z-X-N

China · Guangzhou

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